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BANKRUPTCY AND THE ENVIRONMENTAL
LAWS: THE RESOLVABLE CLASH'
I. INTRODUCTION
"Man has suddenly become aware of the damage"reparable and ir-
reparable"being done to his environment. Whether this concern
has come too late is a perplexing question. Lawyers, in private life
and public life, are being called upon with increasing frequency to
aid in the fight to halt further ecological destruction and repair the
damage already created." 2
Environmental concerns permeate every aspect of American life.
No longer a society struggling to survive, we are attempting to pre-
serve, conserve, and restore our natural surroundings.' While the sev-
enties and eighties initiated environmental awareness,4 the nineties is
the Age of Enlightenment. Americans now realize the blessedness of
the environment.
The purpose of environmental law is to protect the environment
by placing liability for cleanup costs on polluters5 of the ground, air,
and water. However, environmental liability is not cheap. Because
environmental concerns are more pervasive than at first expected, the
cost of complying with environmental laws has increased exponen-
tially.6 Thus, a significant number of companies are finding them-
selves subject to environmental obligations far beyond their ability to
pay7 and are seeking the broad protection of the Federal Bankruptcy
Code.'
1. The author would especially like to thank Rod Notzon, law clerk for the Honorable
Judge Micky Wilson of the Northern District of Oklahoma, Bankruptcy Division, for his
invaluable guidance and assistance.
2. H. Floyd Sherrod Jr., Preface to the 1970 Edition, 1 EN TL L. REv. iii (1970).
3. Id. at xiii.
4. Bernard F. Meroney, Comment, "Taking" on the Environment: The Takings Clause and
Environmental Law"Some Observations, 36 Loy. L. REv. 1083 (1991).
5. Polluters are often referred to as "potentially responsible parties."
6. Arlene Elgart et al., The Interface Between Bankruptcy and Environmental Laws, 46
Bus. LAw. 626 (1991).
7. Caroline C. Fuller, The Effect of Bankruptcy on Environmental Obligations, 21 CoLo.
LAW. 915 (1992).
8. See generally Frank R. Kennedy, The Commencement of a Case Under the New Bank-
ruptcy Code, 36 VAsH. & LEE L. REv. 977 (1979).
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When one focuses on the interplay between environmental laws9
and the Bankruptcy Code, it becomes clear that the policies, consider-
ations, and protections of each area of law do not mesh with one an-
other. An example makes this point easier to visualize: Company X,
a debtor with limited assets, becomes responsible for a significant en-
vironmental liability. How can it comply with environmental regula-
tions without leaving creditors in a more unfavorable position or, in
the worst case scenario, completely unsatisfied? Conversely, how can
Company X get a "fresh start" under the Bankruptcy Code while it is
potentially strictly liable for a costly environmental claim? If Com-
pany X is relieved of significant environmental liability through bank-
ruptcy, the cleanup costs will be borne by innocent taxpayers.
9. The following is a cursory list and explanation of the primary environmental laws
designed to regulate pollution-producing industries and abandoned hazardous waste sites in ef-
fect in our country today.
A. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
("CERCLA")
CERCLA is often referred to as the Superfund Act or the Superfund Legislation. 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-675 (1988). CERCLA imposes liability upon any potentially responsible parties for
damages caused by a release or even a threatened release of a hazardous substance. The follow-
ing types of damages are included in CERCLA:
"response costs incurred by the EPA;
"response costs incurred by private persons;
"natural resource damage claims;
"costs of health assessment or health effects studies. CERCLA imposes strict liability with-
out regard to fault which is joint and several.
B. The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA")
RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-992 (1988), provides a comprehensive statutory scheme that re-
quires the EPA to regulate the generation, transportation, storage, discharge and final disposal
of solid and hazardous wastes. This act includes requirements for the post-disposal monitoring
care of contaminated sites. See generally Morrison et al., Survey of Environmental Issues, 1-3
(December 1988). RCRA additionally authorizes the EPA to obtain injunctive relief to remedi-
ate past bad practices which present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the
environment. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6973 (1988).
C, The Clean Water Act
The Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988), addresses the pollution of surface
water and ground water. This act is intended to regulate the discharge of pollutants into the
navigable waters of the U.S. and requires notification of any spill or discharge of oil or hazard-
ous substances therein. Id. § 1251 (a)(1). There are elaborate requirements for obtaining a per-
mit necessary under the Clean Water Act to discharge a pollutant. 40 C.F.R. § 122 (1982).
D. The Clean Air Act ("CCA")
The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1988), designed to protect and enhance the
quality of the nation's air resources, regulates air pollution by air quality standards and emission
limitations. The Clean Air Act encourages the EPA to have state and local governments prevent
and control air pollution. Id. § 7401. Major amendments to this act are in the proposal stage
currently and should be watched for in the near future.
E. The Toxic Substance Control Act ("TSCA")
The TSCA, 15 U.S.C. § 2601 (1976), regulates commercially produced chemical substances
through identification and control of the manufacture, processing, commercial distribution, use
or disposal of chemicals that pose an unreasonable risk. Id. § 2607(a)(2). This act primarily
responds to problems posed by polychlorinated biphenyls (PCB's).
2
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In furtherance of the need for environmental protection, there
must be legislative reform in the Bankruptcy Code. The changes
must reflect the importance, the priority, and the urgency of environ-
mental laws while clarifying the role of environmental liability as a
debt. Secondly, environmental creditors must be aware of the protec-
tions that the present Bankruptcy Code offers them.
II. BACKGROUND AND BENEFrrs OF BANKRUPTCY LAW
There are two types of bankruptcy proceedings available to a cor-
poration seeking bankruptcy:liquidation and reorganization.10 These
procedures are named after the chapters of the Bankruptcy Code
which govern their operation: Chapter 7 and Chapter 11. Chapter 71"
allows prompt liquidation in a fire-sale style in accordance with statu-
tory procedure. 12 Alternatively, Chapter 11 involves either a con-
trolled liquidation varying in detail from the standard Chapter 7
procedure, or a reorganization and continuation of the business.'3
Thus, Chapter 11 allows more freedom of action according to the par-
ticular circumstances.
When bankruptcy proceedings are initiated, the bankruptcy peti-
tion is filed and a bankruptcy "estate" is created. This estate will con-
tain every right or interest of the debtor's that exists at the time the
petition is filed.14 The property that comprises the estate is no longer
the property of the debtor, and the bankruptcy court must approve
any and all distributions of assets from the "estate" other than those
made in the ordinary course of a continuing business.' 5
In a Chapter 7 proceeding, the corporate entity is dissolved, the
debtor's assets are liquidated, and the proceeds are distributed to
creditors.' 6 The estate is managed by a trustee who is either ap-
pointed by the United States Trustee or elected by the creditors.' 7
10. 11 U.S.C. § 701-66, 1101-74 (1988).
11. Note that entities can be forced into a Chapter 7 proceeding by the use of an involun-
tary bankruptcy petition. See 11 U.S.C. § 303 (1986).
12. 11 U.S.C. 33 704-26 (1988).
13. kle §§ 1101-74; See Ionosphere Clubs, Inc. v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 114 B.R. 379 (S.D.
N.Y. 1990) (stating the bankruptcy court's primary objective is to enable the Chapter 11 debtor
to restructure its business and continue operations).
14. 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1988 and Supp. IV 1992). The estate will include non-possessory inter-
ests like security interests and intangibles. Id.
15. Id. at § 363(c)(1).
16. See Carmen Hernandez-Lonstein et al., ALI-ABA Course of Study Tax and Business
Planning and Restructuring for the 90's: Overview of Chapters 7 and 11 under the U.S. Bank-
ruptcy Code (March 10, 1993).
17. 11 U.S.C. §3 701(a)(1), 702(d) (1988).
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The trustee has a duty to liquidate the debtor's assets and distribute
the proceeds to creditors in order of statutory priority.18 According to
the statutory scheme of priorities, the secured creditors receive the
value of their collateral first. If a secured creditor's claim is not fully
satisfied from the sale of the collateral, that secured creditor becomes
an unsecured creditor for the amount of the claim left to be satisfied.19
Favored unsecured creditors are the next to be paid.20 Finally, the
remaining unsecured creditors are paid to the extent possible.21
Alternatively, Chapter 111 bankruptcy may be available. 3 In
Chapter 11, the estate is ordinarily managed by the debtor corpora-
tion's own officers, acting in lieu of a trustee. The debtor, in this
instance, is allowed to remain in possession of the estate property and
is called a "debtor in possession."'  The court may, however, remove
the debtor from possession and entrust the estate to a specifically ap-
pointed trustee.26 The court also retains power to intervene in the
management of the debtor's business upon request of a party in inter-
est and may fashion appropriate relief to address concerns of the cred-
itors or equity holders.27
The debtor in possession or trustee is expected to develop a plan
for the liquidation or reorganization of the business and the payment
of creditors' debts or claims. A plan must be approved by the credi-
tors and confirmed by the court' following a hearing on the plan.29 It
is here that any party in interest may appear and object to
confirmation. 0
There are three specific devices of a bankruptcy proceeding that
are of particular relevance to any corporate debtor with environmen-
tal liability. These three areas will be examined in chronological order.
First, in all types of bankruptcy cases, once the bankruptcy petition is
18. Id. §§ 704, 725, and 726.
19. Id. §§ 506(a) and 725.
20. Favored unsecured claims include wages, taxes, etc. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 704, 725, and 726
(1988).
21. 11 U.S.C. §§ 507(a) and 726 (1988).
22. Id. §§ 1101-74.
23. Id. § 109.
24. Id. § 1107(a).
25. Id. § 1101(1).
26. Id. § 1104.
27. See In re Gaslight Club, Inc., 782 F.2d 767 (7th Cir. 1986).
28. 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (1988).
29. Id. § 1128(a).
30. It is important to note that an unsuccessful Chapter 11 bankruptcy may, and often does,
end up converted to a Chapter 7. This conversion can happen either at the election of the debtor
or by mandate of the court. Id. § 1112(b).
[Vol. 29:221
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filed an automatic stay commences.31 This stay protects assets of the
estate from all proceedings existing pre-petition or seeking to collect
on a pre-petition claim3 2 and is one of the initial protections sought by
all entities filing bankruptcy. The automatic stay gives the debtor re-
lief from creditors while either planning reorganization under Chapter
11 or taking stock of all available assets under Chapter 7.
This "safe" period allows the debtor relief from the financial
pressures that have culminated in a bankruptcy petition.3 3 Simply, the
automatic stay creates a safe harbor period where creditors must ab-
stain from pursuing collections from the debtor. Importantly, Con-
gress carved out a specific exception to the automatic stay: actions or
proceedings brought by the government to enforce police or regula-
tory powers may be commenced and enforced notwithstanding the ini-
tiation of bankruptcy proceedings and the automatic stay. 4
The second greatest protection offered by the Bankruptcy Code
is the power of abandonment.3 5 To abandon under the Bankruptcy
Code means for the estate to renounce ownership of, or to write off
any legal interest in an item of property. 6 The trustee or debtor in
possession then has the right to sell, use or lease property free and
clear of liens or other interests.37 Alternatively, the trustee or debtor
in possession may simply rid himself of the land .3  This valuable
power allows the abandonment of any unprofitable asset that is bur-
densome or of relatively insignificant value to the estate.39
Finally, the Chapter 11 corporate debtor is required to formulate
a plan of liquidation or reorganization. 4 This plan of repayment must
be approved by the creditors and confirmed by the court.4' Here, the
31. Id. §§ 362(a)(1) and (2).
32. Id.
33. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 340-42 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6296-99; see also S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 49-55 (1978), reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. § 787, §§ 5835-41.
34. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b) (1988).
35. Id. §§ 363 and 554.
36. An ordinary property owner does not have the right to sell his land out from under legal
encumbrances, but to some extent a bankruptcy trustee or debtor in possession can do so. Id.
§ 363(0. Additionally, an ordinary property owner does not have the right to rid himself of
contaminated land by merely announcing, "I do not want this land," but again to some extent a
bankruptcy Trustee or debtor in possession may do just that. Id. at § 554.
37. Id. § 363(0.
38. 11 U.S.C. § 554 (1988 & Supp. IV (1992)).
39. Id. § 554(a).
40. Id. § 1121.
41. See id. § 1129.
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court may implement the absolute priority rule4Z which allows a credi-
tor to demand full payment before any creditor junior to him may be
paid at all.
III. AREAS OF CONCERN IN THE INTERFACE OF ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW AND T=E BANKRUPTCY CODE
A number of issues are raised when environmental liability is ad-
dressed under the Federal Bankruptcy Code. The following three is-
sues are the most significant and, unfortunately, the most unclear:
A. Is environmental liability for reimbursement of remediation
costs and government orders requiring cleanup of contamination sub-
ject to the automatic stay?
B. Can a trustee or debtor in possession sell or abandon prop-
erty regardless of environmental liability associated with the land?
C. Can a debtor escape environmental liability through confir-
mation of a creative Chapter 11 plan?43
The remainder of this paper will address the issues presented in
regard to the corporate debtor only. Additionally, this paper will sug-
gest changes to clarify the role of environmental liability in a bank-
ruptcy proceeding. These suggestions are based upon the premise that
while bankruptcy is a useful and needed tool for the floundering
debtor, environmental laws must have priority over bankruptcy
security.
IV. ANALYSIS OF IsSUES
A. Automatic Stay
Upon the initial filing of the bankruptcy petition," the property
of the estate is protected by an automatic stay of most proceedings
that could have been brought pre-petition and all proceedings seeking
to collect on a pre-petition claim.45 This is the "breathing spell" phase
of the bankruptcy process. 46 The stay detains creditors from racing to
the courthouse with pre-bankruptcy claims and, instead, forces them
42. See id. § 1129(b).
43. See id. § 1141(d)(1).
44. A bankruptcy case begins with the filing of a voluntary petition by the debtor or an
involuntary petition against the debtor. Id. §§ 301 and 303.
45. Id. § 362(a).
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into court all at once. The Bankruptcy Code sets out specific excep-
tions to the automatic stay.47 One of the exceptions states that pro-
ceedings brought by the government to enforce police or regulatory
powers are exempt from the stay.48 Legislative history regarding this
exception indicates it was intended to exempt actions designed to pre-
vent or to stop violations of environmental laws.4 9
Although this exception is especially relevant in the environmen-
tal arena, it does not apply to governmental proceedings seeking to
enforce a money judgment.50 Thus, while it appears that environmen-
tal proceedings enforce police or regulatory powers and are not sub-
ject to the automatic stay, exactly what constitutes "enforcing police
or regulatory power" is not clear. This issue has been the subject of
much litigation and no clear standard has yet emerged.
Where the government seeks exemption from the automatic stay,
recent case law has created two distinct hurdles. First, is the govern-
mental action an exercise of regulatory or police power?51 Second, if
so, is it merely an action to collect a money judgment? 52 It appears,
however, that while ostensibly analyzing under two prongs, courts
often run the questions together. The result is that both parts of the
test are usually analyzed in one argument and lead to a single
conclusion.
Generally speaking, bankruptcy will not interfere with an action
to cleanup a site that is posing a direct threat to public welfare and
safety. On the other hand, bankruptcy will interfere with the collec-
tion of debts - in the nature of fines or reimbursement of costs - which
are merely the aftermath of situations where public welfare and safety
have already been protected. In the most simplistic terms, if the gov-
ernment is actually attempting to right an imposing threat to the com-
munity, bankruptcy will allow the action to proceed. However, if the
government is attempting merely to reimburse themselves for previ-
ous expenditures, bankruptcy will halt this process to the benefit of
the debtor's estate.
47. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
48. Id. § 362(b)(4).
49. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 46, at 343, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6299. This
report provides one of the few references to environmental laws.
50. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(5) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
51. Id. § 362(b)(4).
52. Id § 362(b)(5).
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1. Is the Governmental Action an Exercise of Regulatory or
Police Power?
When debtors in possession and trustees are faced with claims for
reimbursement of cleanup and remediation costs, they often plead
that these claims are actually not police or regulatory powers but, in-
stead, actions to collect a pre-petition debt. Thus, they claim the ac-
tions are subject to the automatic stay.
When this issue is presented, courts focus their reasoning on the
primary purpose of the action: whether the government is using regu-
latory or police powers. One test used by the courts is the "pecuniary
purpose test."53 Under this test, the court questions whether the gov-
ernmental action relates primarily to property or to matters of public
health, safety, and welfare.54 If a proceeding is found to relate primar-
ily to matters of public safety, health, and welfare, it is excepted from
the automatic stay.55 An alternative test is the "public policy test"56
where the court looks to a proceeding to determine if the proceeding
effectuates a public policy or if it adjudicates a private right. Only
proceedings that effectuate a public policy are excepted from the au-
tomatic stay.
An illustrative case is United States v. MattiaceY7 In Mattiace, the
E.P.A. asked that one million dollars be paid to them to implement a
clean up of the company's waste site. Mattiace filed Chapter 11 bank-
ruptcy. The debtor in possession argued that the government was not
exercising regulatory or police power but, instead, was merely seeking
to further their pecuniary interest. The court, reasoning that CER-
CLA was enacted for the purpose of protecting public health, safety,
and welfare,58 held that actions by the government under CERCLA
were actions for the enforcement of police or regulatory power. As
such, these actions were exempt from the automatic stay.5 9
53. In re Commerce Oil Co., 847 F.2d 291, 295 (6th Cir. 1988).
54. Id.
55. Id. Note that the vagueness of the word "related" could potentially lead to inconsistent
results.
56. Id.
57. 73 B.R. 816 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 1987).
58. The third circuit noted earlier that "the exception to the automatic stay provision ...
should itself be construed broadly, and no unnatural efforts be made to limit its scope." Penn
Terra Ltd. v. Dept. of Envtl Resources, 733 F.2d 267, 273 (3d Cir. 1984). The court further
observed that no more obvious exercise of the state's power to protect the health, safety, and
welfare of the public can be imagined than to rectify harmful environmental hazards.
59. Mattiace, 73 B.R. at 819. See also 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) (1988). The response in Mattiace
seems inconsistent with the policies of bankruptcy because the site in question was not continu-
ing to contaminate and, thus, was not an immediate threat to public safety. Bankruptcy should
[Vol. 29:221
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In another of these cases, In Re Commonwealth Oil Refining
Co.,6" a debtor in possession operating a RCRA interim status refin-
ing facility6' did not submit Part B of the RCRA permit application.62
The E.P.A. issued a compliance order requiring the debtor in posses-
sion to either submit Part B or to file a closing plan. The debtor in
possession requested that this action be subject to the automatic stay
because it was only compelling "technical violation" compliance. 63
The debtor in possession further argued that the exception to the au-
tomatic stay for police and regulatory powers was only invocable
when there was a threat of immediate and identifiable harm.64 The
court rejected this argument and held that compliance with informa-
tion gathering and permitting procedures, "falls squarely within the
police and regulatory powers. ' 65 Thus, this action was exempt from
the automatic stay.66
2. Is the Action Merely an Action to Collect a Money
Judgment?
If the action is found to be merely an action seeking to collect a
money judgment, it will fit within the "exception to the exception"
and, thus, will be subject to the automatic stay. Therefore, even if the
action seeking to collect money damages is a valid use of the govern-
ment's police or regulatory powers, it will not be excepted and will be
subject to the automatic stay.
Debtors in possession and trustees have argued that any action by
the government that ultimately requires them to expend money is an
action equivalent to the enforcement of a money judgment and conse-
quently should be subject to the automatic stay. Essentially, this argu-
ment is all-encompassing. Should the ability of a claim to be stayed
merely depend upon the bankrupt's ability to wrangle the claim into a
not interfere where the government seeks to remedy an existing public hazard. It should inter-
fere when the action seeks to reimburse a unit for a specific sum.
60. 805 F.2d 1175 (5th Cir. 1986).
61. The facility was interim because it was not technically approved by the E.P.A. until all
reports were filed.
62. Commonwealth, 805 F.2d at 1179.
63. Ld. at 1182.
64. Id.
65. Id at 1186 (quoting Penn Terra Ltd. v. Dept. of Envtl. Resources, 733 F.2d 267,274 (3d
Cir. 1984)). The result here is consistent with the purposes of bankruptcy in as much as requiring
either part B or a closing plan does not take estate property from other creditors. Additionally,
the action may help the government to determine whether there is a situation requiring immedi-
ate cleanup.
66. See also Penn Terra Ltd. v. Dept. of Envtl. Resources, 733 F.2d 267, 274 (3d Cir. 1984);
In re Security Gas and Oil, Inc., 70 B.R. 786 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1987).
9
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form of a money judgment? Courts are presently divided on this
issue.
In Ohio v. Kovacs,67 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the auto-
matic stay does apply in an action which ultimately requires the ex-
penditure of money.68 Conversely, the Penn Terra9 court came to the
realistic conclusion that almost anything in today's society necessitates
the spending of money.7' They refused to construe the term "money
judgment" broadly and, instead, defined it as a collection of a sum
certain.71
When determining if a claim is for a money judgment and thus
subject to the automatic stay, courts have categorized environmental
claims into three areas. First, "money judgments" occur when a party
is seeking to be reimbursed for money spent on cleaning up contami-
nation. Second, "essentially money judgments" exist when a party has
no practical ability to do a clean up, yet the government seeks to com-
pel the party to do so. Finally, injunctive relief occurs when a court
issues an order to a party to clean up a site that is continuing to con-
taminate the air, water, or ground.
Pure money judgments generally are subject to the automatic
stay. In Brock v. Morysville Body Works, Inc.,72 for example, the
court refused to enforce $21,000 in fines for violations of OSHA 73 reg-
ulations. The court noted the fines were merely punishment for past
violations and OSHA was strictly seeking the enforcement of a money
judgment. They ruled that the collection of fines was not a govern-
mental police power and was not exempt from the automatic stay.74
An analogous situation occurred in United States v. Standard Metal
Corp.' There, a debtor in possession faced with penalties for viola-
tions of the Clean Water Act advanced the argument that the govern-
ment was merely enforcing a money judgment. The court held that
assessment of civil penalties was within the classic regulatory enforce-
ment power advanced by the automatic stay provision.76 Although
67. 469 U.S. 274 (1985).
68. IL at 282. See also In re Thomas Solvent Co., 44 B.R. 83 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1984).
69. 733 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1984).
70. Id. at 277-78.
71. Id. at 277.
72. 829 F.2d 383 (3d Cir. 1987).
73. Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
74. Brock, 829 F.2d at 389-90.
75. 49 B.R. 623 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1985).
76. Id. at 625.
[Vol. 29:221
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the court entered a judgment for the government,77 it ruled that col-
lection had to be done in accordance with bankruptcy proceedings. 78
This decision seems to make a very valid and very necessary point:
the state can assess penalties but it cannot collect them except by get-
ting in line with everybody else.
An interesting compromise was reached in In re Thomas Solvent
Co.,7 9 where a debtor in possession sought to enjoin a state court or-
der requiring the debtor in possession to remediates° polluted ground-
water. The court found that the enforcement of the cleanup order was
in fact an enforcement of a money judgment. Thus, they held that a
governmental unit could not deplete the assets of a bankrupt's estate
to comply with a cleanup order because Congress had not afforded
priority to environmental claims.8' However, in a victory for environ-
mental activists, the court also ruled that a debtor in possession could
not continue to operate as a viable business and avoid its environmen-
tal obligations to society by simply initiating Chapter 11 proceed-
ings. 2 The court enjoined the state from enforcing the cleanup order,
forcing the debtor to file a Chapter 7 proceeding. It further
threatened to grant the state relief from the automatic stay if the
debtor in possession did not file a Chapter 7 liquidation plan within 90
days.8 3
The second category the courts have used in determining if an
action is merely for a money judgment is that of "essentially a money
judgment." In In re Kovacs,' the state demanded that the debtor pay
for cleanup costs after the state had appointed a receiver to perform
the cleanup.85 The court noted that the debtor had been divested of
his property and, therefore, was personally unable to perform the
cleanup. Thus, the only way the debtor could comply with the direc-
tive was by paying the money to the receiver. The court found that
77. Id. The court further noted the fine would serve as a deterrent to future releases.
78. Id. Note that penalties against a debtor in possession or a trustee for post-petition
violations are outside of the automatic stay and are collectable from the estate. United States
Dep't of Interior v. Elliot, 761 F.2d 168, 171 (4th Cir. 1985).
79. 44 B.R. 83 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1984).
80. To remediate in the environmental sense means to cleanup and restore the contami-
nated area.
81. See Thomas, 44 B.R. at 87-88.
82. Id. at 88.
83. Id
84. 681 F.2d 454 (6th Cir. 1982), rev'd on other grounds by Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274
(1985).
85. The state cleaned up the site and was requesting refund of the cost from the bankrupt.
11
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the state was essentially trying to enforce a money judgment and was
subject to the automatic stay.86
The third category is that of injunctions. These are not usually
subject to the automatic stay. 7 Generally, however, a debtor in pos-
session or a trustee will argue that an injunction is merely an order
compelling them to spend money and, therefore, is seeking to enforce
a money judgment. Consequently, they argue that the action is sub-
ject to the automatic stay.
Recent decisions"8 have limited the definition of "money judg-
ment". In Illinois v. Electric Utilities,8 9 Illinois sought to enjoin the
debtor from disposing PCB's under TSCA and to remediate existing
contamination. Before judgment was entered, the debtor filed a
Chapter 11 petition and argued that the injunction should be stayed.
The court ruled that states were insulated from automatic stay provi-
sions when initiating proceedings to protect citizens from environmen-
tal hazards. 90
In a situation where the government was seeking an injunction
requiring the debtor to perform reclamation work at an abandoned
mine site, the action was found to be within the regulatory and police
power exception to the automatic stay.91 The government was seek-
ing performance by the debtor to correct a continuing threat, not a
payment of money.92
Likewise, in United States v. ILCO, Inc.,9' an order forcing a
debtor to clean up a hazardous site was found not to be an enforce-
ment of a money judgment. The court observed that Congress indi-
cated preservation of the debtor's estate was not always the dominant
goal and the "enforcement of an injunction ordering compliance with
environmental laws is more important than the debtor's right to have
a breathing spell." 94
86. In Re Kovacs, 681 F.2d at 456.
87. Illinois v. Electric Utilities, 41 B.R. 874 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1984).
88. One of the earliest decisions on injunctive relief in the bankruptcy context is United
States v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 13 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20310, 20311 (D.N.H.
Nov. 15, 1982), in which the court ruled that an injunction requiring the debtor to abate a long-
existing asbestos dump resembled a money judgment and was subject to the automatic stay. A
possible explanation here is that had the problem been dealt with earlier and not been long-
existing, the court might have been more willing to believe the government had it felt the dump
was a public welfare threat.
89. 41 B.R. 874 (Bankr. N.D. IM. 1984).
90. Id. at 875-76.
91. United States v. Gregory and Sons, Inc., 58 B.R. 590, 591 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1986).
92. Id. at 593.
93. 48 B.R. 1016 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1985).
94. Id. at 1023.
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The most notable case in the realm of injunctions, however, is
Penn Terra Ltd. v. Department of Environmental Resources.95 Here
the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources obtained a
consent decree which required Penn Terra to reclaim subsurface coal
mines.96 Penn Terra had, by this time, ceased all mining operations.
Before complying with the order, Penn Terra filed Chapter 7 bank-
ruptcy, and Pennsylvania attempted to require the debtor and trustee
to comply with the consent order.9 7 The court held that the state in-
junction directing the debtor to perform the reclamation work was not
an enforcement of a money order and, therefore, was not subject to
the automatic stay.
The court in Penn Terra set forth two criteria for determining if
an order is a money judgment: (1) the form, and (2) the purpose of
the relief sought. As to form, a money judgment is one that identifies
the parties and defines a sum certain that the debtor is required to pay
to the state.98 As to the purpose of the relief, the court must inquire
whether the remedy would compensate for past wrongs or protect
against future harm. The court pointed out that it is unlikely that any
action which seeks to prevent culpable conduct in the future will man-
ifest itself as an action for a money judgment or one to enforce a
money judgment.99
The Penn Terra court held that an action seeking to require a
debtor to clean up an environmental hazard does not become an ac-
tion to enforce a money judgment solely because the debtor must ex-
pend money to comply with the order."° It also noted that
compliance with virtually any injunction costs money.1' 1 The action in
Penn Terra was found to be intended to prevent future harm and not
subject to the stay.'02
In summary, if the enforcement of a money judgment requires
the debtor to pay a sum certain either for cleanup costs or fines, the
action will be subject to the automatic stay. However, actions under
CERCLA enforcing cleanup mandates are generally the exception
95. 733 F.2d. 267 (3d Cir. 1984).
96. Id. at 269.
97. Id. at 269-70.
98. Id. at 275.
99. Id. at 276-77.
100. Penn Terra Ltd. v. Dept. of Envtl. Resources, 733 F.2d 267, 277 (3d Cir. 1984)
101. I. at 277-78.
102. Id. at 278. See also Friends of the Sakonnet v. Dutra, 125 B.R. 69, 71-72 (Bankr. D.R.I.
1991); In re Laurinburg Oil Co., Inc., 49 B.R. 652, 654 (Bankr. M.D. N.C. 1984). But cf. Ohio v.
Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274 (1985)(noting debtor no longer possessed the property and thus could not
fulfill the injunction).
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and are not subject to the automatic stay. Secondly, actions in which
the debtor is no longer in possession of the property and can comply
in no way but by tendering money to the state receiver are deemed
"essentially money judgments" and are also subject to the automatic
stay. Finally, injunctive actions compelling action by the debtor to
prevent future harm will usually be exceptions to the automatic stay.
Injunctive actions will be carefully scrutinized in their form and
purpose.
In practice, the enforcement of injunctive cleanup orders may
mean depletion of the assets of a bankrupt's estate and a non-statu-
tory priority for environmental claims. However, non-enforcement
could cause continuing environmental damage. Thus, where the
debtor's operation causes continuing pollution, the only reasonable al-
ternative is to shut the debtor down even where such action will ruin
an attempted reorganization.
B. Abandonment of Property
A trustee or debtor in possession has the power to dispose of
burdensome property by selling, leasing, or abandoning it.10 3 This
abandonment option is a powerful temptation to a debtor in posses-
sion or trustee of environmentally burdensome property. The ques-
tion central to this area of the Code is whether the power to abandon
burdensome property exists regardless of associated environmental
liability.
The Code generally allows the bankrupt to abandon an asset
when the cost of removing or decontaminating the asset is greater
than the value of the asset.1" Often, environmentally contaminated
land is worth less than the cleanup costs. When the estate chooses to
abandon this liability-strapped land, control of the land reverts back
to the debtor or, in the alternative, to any party with a possessory
interest in the land. The person to whom the land reverts is then
weighted with the burden of complying with the cleanup mandate.10 5
Thus, it is possible that the land and its associated liability will revert
to the assetless debtor. 1°6
103. 11 U.S.C. §§ 363 and 554 (1988).
104. Id.
105. Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 285; see also In re Purco, 76 B.R. 523 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1987).
106. The Code and present case law is unclear as to what happens when land reverts to an
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The government does not approve of abandonment in this con-
text. The benefit of removing the encumbered property from the es-
tate and allowing a more equitable reorganization or liquidation
ultimately flows to the creditors. The burden of cleaning up the con-
taminated property, however, falls on the taxpayers.
The U.S. Supreme Court began a reconciliation of the right of
abandonment under the Bankruptcy Code with the state's environ-
mental laws. 107 A debtor, Quanta Resources Corp., filed a Chapter 11
petition which they later converted into a Chapter 7 proceeding. The
site in question contained rusting storage drums containing 70,000 gal-
lons of PCB 08 contaminated waste oil. 0 9 Quanta's trustee attempted
a sale of the site which proved futile." 0 The trustee then notified the
bankruptcy court that he intended to abandon this burdensome prop-
erty"' that was of insignificant value to the estate. 1 2 The state im-
mediately sought to bar the abandonment on the theory that the
abandoned site would threaten public safety and would be an unlaw-
ful discharge of hazardous waste." 3 Arguing that abandonment
would revest title into Quanta" an entity with no assets and unable to
effectuate a cleanup " the state asked that the trustee be ordered to
bring the site into environmental compliance. 114 The state reasoned
that abandonment of the site would effectuate a disposal of hazardous
waste resulting in a continuing violation. 1 5
The court agreed with the state's argument and held that the
trustee could not abandon property in contravention of state and local
laws aimed at protecting public health and safety." 6 Thus, the deci-
sion greatly restricted the power of abandonment when the land in
question is environmentally substandard. The lower court's deci-
sion," 7 upheld by the Supreme Court, noted that the state's interest in
protecting the public was greater than that of the creditors' ofQuanta.118
107. Midlantic Natl Bank v. New Jersey Dept. of Envtl Protection, 474 U.S. 494 (1986).
108. Polychlorinated Biphenyls.
109. Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 497.
110. Id.
111. 11 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1988).
112. Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dept. of Envtl Protection, 474 U.S. 494 (1986).
113. Id. at 498.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 502.
117. In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d 912 (3d Cir. 1984).
118. Id. at 922. The dissent suggested this was allowing the trustee to "reach into the credi-
tor's pockets for the cost of the cleanup." This valid point is mitigated only by a narrow reading
of the majority ruling. Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 923.
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Lower courts have emerged with an array of interpretations of
Midlantic. The narrow interpretation 19 is that abandonment is al-
lowed where there will be no imminent and identifiable harm to the
public despite noncompliance with environmental laws. For example,
in In Re Oklahoma Refining Co.120 a trustee attempted to abandon a
closed oil refinery from which toxic waste was leaching into a creek
and surrounding areas. The leach, however, did not pose imminent
harm to public health, safety, and welfare. The trustee attempted to
insure the contamination would go no further than the site. The court
approved the abandonment stating that Midlantic did not require
strict compliance with environmental laws but only that the court
weigh the laws as factors when contemplating the abandonment.121
The court also looked favorably upon the fact that this trustee took
steps to mitigate the contamination and that this site posed no "imme-
diate and menacing harm" to the public. 22 Finally, the court sug-
gested that to enforce strict compliance with environmental laws
would create a bankruptcy case in perpetuity and fetter the estate to
an unresolvable situation.123
The broader interpretation of Midlantic is that trustees or debtors
in possession may not abandon any property that is not in full compli-
ance with environmental laws. For example, in In re Stevens124 the
operator of a scrap metal business was improperly storing drums con-
taining PCB contaminated oil in a tractor-trailer box. The operator
filed a Chapter 7 petition, and, subsequently, the state contended the
storage continued to violate the law and requested the trustee to have
the waste oil removed. The trustee did not do so and, instead, held a
sale at the site. During the sale, the trustee roped off the tractor-
trailer box and posted warning signs. The state removed the drums
and then sought to recover costs from the debtor's estate. The court
rejected the trustee's argument that it had reasonably protected the
public by roping off the drums and posting warning signs." s Instead,
they ruled that Midlantic leaves no room for an estate to avoid its
cleanup obligations by abandonment. 26
119. See In re Pierce Coal and Construction, Inc., 65 B.R. 521 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va. 1986); In
re Shore Co., Inc., 134 B.R. 572, 578 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1991).
120. 63 B.tR at 563 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1986).
121. Id. at 565.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. 68 B.R. 774 (Bankr. D. Me. 1987).
125. See id. at 778.
126. ld. at 781.
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Likewise, in another broad interpretation of Midlantic, the court
in In re Peerless Plating Co.'27 said that abandonment would only be
permitted in three circumstances: (1) if the environmental laws were
so onerous that they interfered with the bankruptcy proceeding; (2) if
the environmental laws were not designed to protect public health and
safety from identifiable hazards;'2 s or (3) if the violation created by
the abandonment would be merely speculative or indeterminate. The
Peerless court found that even the depletion of an estate's assets in
order to comply with environmental law is not a condition so onerous
as to interfere with bankruptcy proceedings. 29
In summary, courts are not in agreement as to when abandon-
ment of environmentally burdened property will be permitted. It does
appear, however, that any property posing a clear and dangerous
threat to the public cannot be abandoned.
C. The Reorganization or Liquidation Plan and Discharge
To attempt to remain in business and avoid liquidation, a corpo-
ration may opt to file Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Chapter 11 reflects the
Code's theory that allowing a floundering business to restructure ben-
efits our economy by preserving jobs and business ethics. In Chapter
11 the debtor, trustee, or creditor(s) must formulate a liquidation or
reorganization plan.'30 The plan must be presented to and confirmed
by the court in order for the corporation to remain in chapter 11.131
In order to appreciate the importance of the plan in bankruptcy
actions involving environmental liability, it is necessary to understand
the meaning and ramifications of discharge. Discharge renders any
unpaid debt forever uncollectible and such debt literally ceases to ex-
ist.132 Discharge occurs in Chapter 11 when a plan is confirmed. 33
Therefore, in order to mitigate the adverse effect of discharge, a credi-
tor should see to it that the plan that is confirmed leaves as little debt
unpaid as possible.
127. 70 B.t. 943 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1987).
128. It would a rare environmental law that was not designed to protect public health and
safety from identifiable hazards.
129. Peerless, 70 B.R. at 947.
130. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1121(c), (d) (1988).
131. Id.
132. Id. § 524(a). The debtor's plan must be satisfied for the debtor to emerge from bank-
ruptcy. When a plan is not satisfied, a forced Chapter 7 may result.
133. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d) (1988).
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The amount paid on a particular debt (or conversely, unpaid and
discharged) depends on the provisions of each plan, which are varia-
ble. The provisions of a plan depend, in turn, on a combination of
negotiation and statutory requirements. The creditor who knows how
to use the statutory requirements improves his ability to negotiate
favorable treatment in the plan.
The first option creditors need to be aware of is that, if the debtor
stalls, the creditor can write his own plan. 3 The serious threat of a
creditor's plan is often sufficient to make a debtor extremely reason-
able. If the plan is the debtor's, the creditor needs to know the follow-
ing three provisions. First, a creditor is entitled to vote on a plan if it
hurts or impairs the creditor.135 A creditor is impaired when he will
not be fully satisfied. Second, if the creditor or his class vote against
the plan, it cannot be confirmed136 unless, third, the debtor satisfies
the absolute priority rule. The absolute priority rule essentially guar-
antees a dissenting creditor full repayment. 37  Under this rule, the
plan will only be confirmed when (1) the debtor requests confirma-
tion; (2) the plan does not discriminate unfairly; and (3) the plan is fair
and equitable. 38 In practice, this standard means that a creditor may
not receive or retain any property under a reorganization plan unless
all creditors senior to him have their claims paid in full. 3 9 Thus, envi-
ronmental debt will be satisfied in full where the creditor actively
pursues repayment.14
Consequently, if a corporate debtor is relieved of environmental
liability through discharge by the plan, the fault lies with the creditor
for not being actively involved in the bankruptcy proceeding. Without
strict scrutiny of the debtor's plan by the environmental creditor, the
debtor may escape environmental liability by discharge of the debt.
Hence, even where environmental creditors find themselves unable to
obtain relief from the automatic stay, they can use Chapter 11 to their
134. Id. § 1121(c)(d).
135. Any class not impaired is deemed to have accepted the plan and the debtor and court
need not solicit acceptance. 11 U.S.C. § 1126(f) (1988); In re American Solar King Corp., 90
B.R. 808, (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1988).
136. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(8)(A) (1988).
137. Id. This section is also often referred to as the cram down provision.
138. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (1986).
139. See H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 413 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5963, 6369 (stating that the court may confirm a plan over the dissent of a class of unsecured
claims only if the members of the class will receive property under the plan equal to the amount
of their unsecured claim; in other words, if the creditor is not paid in full, creditors junior to him
will receive nothing at all.).
140. In re Ruti-Sweetwater, Inc., 836 F.2d 1263 (10th Cir. 1988).
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advantage and make the debtor repay the debt sooner or later. Chap-
ter 11 is truly a sword for the environmental creditor and not merely a
shield for the environmental debtor as commonly believed.
V. SUGGESTIONS FOR CHANGE
Bankruptcy and environmental protection policies clash because
fulfillment of one policy weakens the other. 1 ' One set of laws must
be given some type of priority. Although bankruptcy is a useful and
needed tool for the struggling debtor, the unequaled importance of
our environment dictates that environmental laws have priority over
bankruptcy security and a well defined role in bankruptcy proceed-
ings. Therefore, I propose several changes in the Bankruptcy Code.
Additionally, this paper points out provisions of the Code that envi-
ronmental creditors should be aware of and use to their benefit.
A. Automatic Stay
I suggest that Congress adopt a specific environmental provision
in the automatic stay section 42 of the Code. This provision would
demand that in cases of continuing environmental contamination pos-
ing a threat to public welfare, the debtor rectify the contamination
immediately as a requirement of remaining in Chapter 11. Even
though such action might deplete the bankruptcy estate, this outcome
is preferable to allowing continuing contamination.
The environmentalist will realize the true crux of the issue is not
who pays but how the contamination can be stopped, cleaned up and
rectified as quickly as possible. By adopting this provision the imme-
diate and potentially dangerous problem will be solved, although it
may be at the cost of the debtor's additional creditors. Further, this
provision would merely parallel the legislature's evident desire for en-
vironmental accountability in the environmental laws. The govern-
ment's interest in a healthy and pure environment is vital to the long
term future of its people.
B. Abandonment
The second change in the Code I propose is that the estate's
power of abandonment be restricted to prohibit the abandonment of
141. Lowell E. Blackham, The Unstoppable Force Hits the Immovable Wall Should Environ-
mental Liability Be Discharged in Bankruptcy?, 25 CREIGHTON L. REv. 1357, 1381 (1992).
142. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1990).
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any land continuing to pollute or continuing to be contaminated and,
thus, creating a public welfare crisis. The provision should require the
estate to bring the land into environmental compliance and rectify the
causes of the continuing contamination prior to abandonment. Again,
the essential goal must be to rectify environmental hazards. After the
land is in compliance, the estate should be allowed to sell the land,
thus, creating revenue with which other creditors may be satisfied.
It is not just or equitable for the assetless debtor, who generally
has no method by which to remedy the situation, or a potentially inno-
cent prior owner to become responsible for the environmental
cleanup. It is especially unjust where the land is not an immediate
threat requiring immediate attention. The Bankruptcy Code poses far
too great a temptation to an owner of contaminated property to file
Chapter 11, dispose of the land and the financial responsibility at-
tached with it, reorganize, and continue operations.
C. Plan of Liquidation or Reorganization and Discharge
Finally, as the Code exists today, environmental creditors should
be aware of the absolute priority rule and should not allow a poor
plan to become an approved plan. For the good of society at large,
environmental creditors must use Chapter 11 as a sword to demand
repayment of their debts. Active creditor pursuit of environmental
priority assures creditors, debtors, and citizens that environmental lia-
bility cannot be escaped under the Bankruptcy Code.
D. Effects of Proposed Changes
It is certain that such consequential changes would alter the
bankruptcy process with regard to environmental obligations. The
changes could, most notably, place the additional creditors of the es-
tate in a more unfavorable position than they would have been had
the environmental liability disappeared whether by discharge or aban-
donment.143 This result however, is more favorable than allowing
143. This possibility should cause the creditor to be more careful in selecting debtors and
lead to more long-range planning by both the debtor and creditor. The higher cost of capital
markets and trade credit should be reflected in the debtor company's prices, thus, passing along
the cost of environmental compliance to the consumer of the debtor company's products. Such
cost internalization is efficient from an economic perspective. Thus, it is more sensible for the
creditors who choose to deal with a particular company to bear the costs of bad business deci-
sions or lost opportunities than it is for the taxpayer. Perhaps such a practice will induce credi-
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contamination to continue to harm the environment while the corpo-
rate debtor attempts to reorganize its business. Surely, the damage
done to the debtor's additional creditors is outweighed by the need for
environmental compliance. The Bankruptcy Code should not be
available as a tool for the ridding of environmental liability.
With the proposed changes, Congress should expect longer peri-
ods of repayment of response costs, however, this result is preferable
to having claims left unsatisfied as the case tends to be presently. Ad-
ditionally, with a less permissive bankruptcy option, corporations
would necessarily be more aware and conscious of their environmen-
tal actions and inactions. This increased awareness should ultimately
lead to purer lands, air, and waters.
Most importantly, the proposed changes would in each and every
situation provide a mechanism for immediate cleanup of threatening
contamination. The monetary fight can continue after the land, air, or
water has been freed of contamination. This change would be a giant
step towards the protection of the environment for those who are the
environment's greatest threat. The maintenance of our environment
is paramount to any other concern for it is the environment that sus-
tains our race.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Bankruptcy Code plays an important role in the maintenance
of our economy. Unfortunately, federal courts are overlooking the
public policy concerns behind the bankruptcy/environmental conflict.
Debtors must be held accountable for all on going environmental
hazards and should not be able to dismiss liability through a poorly
approved reorganization plan under the guise and protection of the
Bankruptcy Code. When this is allowed to happen the message to
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